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Abstract 
 
Intergovernmental Service Agreements, or IGSAs, are contracts wherein Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) partners with local governments for immigrant detention space. 
Despite comprising a large portion of the large immigrant detention network in the United States, 
these contracts are incredibly understudied in the literature on immigration policy and 
immigration federalism. This opacity of empirical information surrounding IGSAs is 
problematic, particularly when these facilities have recently come under fire for their conditions 
and for the lack of transparency surrounding their operation.  
Therefore, this project is designed to provide a basic empirical summary of contemporary 
IGSA facilities, in addition to providing initial insights into how these agreements affect the 
local governments that are party to them. The findings suggest that ICE uses these contracts as a 
means of expediently creating and dissolving detention spaces across the country, meaning that 
these contracts are a source of long-term fiscal instability to many towns. These findings add to 
the literature and investigations of ICE’s practices that indict the agency for their negligence and 
secrecy.   
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Introduction:  
 Immigration detention has recently featured heavily in national discourse, and weighed 
heavily in the national conscience. The summer of 2018 brought to light the realities of the 
Trump Administration’s family separation policies: images of children in cages and audio 
recordings of children crying out for their absent parents haunted television news broadcasts, 
calling into question the motivations and actions of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). Outcry against this federal agency grew, as both immigrant activists and prominent 
national politicians called for the abolition of ICE, citing the suffering of separated migrant 
children in facilities such as South Texas Family Residential Center. Less attention focused on 
another entity involved in the creation and operation of this prison for immigrant children: the 
town of Dilley, a rural Texas municipality with a population below 5,000 residents.  
 South Texas Family Residential Center, the source of many of the photographs of 
separated children that haunted the national conscience and 24-hour news cycle, is an immigrant 
detention center established through an Intergovernmental Service Agreement, or IGSA. An 
IGSA is an agreement that allows ICE to make municipal governments, like this tiny Texan town 
in Frio County, party to a contract for an immigrant detention center. Alongside Secure 
Communities and 287(g), the immigrant detention IGSAs another means that ICE utilizes to 
coordinate local participation in federal immigration enforcement activities. Unlike the latter 
initiatives, however, IGSA detention centers are understudied in the academic and policy 
literature on immigration federalism.  
This project seeks to change that, by undertaking an investigation into the factors that 
motivate the creation – and the termination – of these local-level contracts for federal detention 
spaces. This project will reveal that IGSA distribution across the country is counterintuitive in 
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some respects – as the facilities are densely arranged in some Democratic-voting states – while 
simultaneously comporting to time-held theories of immigration policy responses, such as ethnic 
threat theory (Blalock 1967). Furthermore, the cases of IGSA creation and termination examined 
here reveal the uncertainty that defines the partnerships, including sudden termination of 
contracts, mis-labelling of municipal policies in ICE databases, and general lack of consistent 
protocol that existed across the case studies. These findings demonstrate that, despite the 
promises of increased revenue and employment, the ad-hoc nature of these controversial 
partnerships often do more harm to local governments than good.  
To understand the factors driving municipalities to participate (or not) in the immigration 
detention system today, one must first understand the legislative history of “crimmigration,” 
policies that devolved immigration enforcement and detention responsibilities to state and local 
police. After an outline of the legal historical literature on the confluence of immigration 
detention with criminal justice policy, this introduction will examine the contemporary size and 
structure of the current immigration detention system. Yet the academic literature has less to say 
about the causal factors shaping municipal decisions to participate in immigrant detention, 
highlighting the puzzle of how IGSAs emerge and recede, which this research aims to address.  
The Birth of Punitive, Localized Immigration Detention: A Brief Legislative History 
Immigration detention centers are carceral entities, modeled heavily after jails and 
prisons, despite the fact that “residing in the United States without proper authorization is 
technically a civil code violation—the kind of infraction for which detention cannot be used as 
punishment” (Gottschalk 2014, 219). How did immigration detention become so confluent with 
the prison system? Historically, legislative clauses that have defined the boundaries and practices 
of immigration detention have been couched within larger anti-crime bills, reifying the 
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criminalization of undocumented immigrants and a confluence between immigration 
enforcement and general crime control. These historical contingencies allow us to understand 
why local jails are the site of many immigrant detainees today, despite the theoretically and 
legally civil nature of immigration violations.  
Scholar César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández (2013) outlines how the 1986 Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act legislatively established an infrastructure that incorporated immigration detention into 
the practice of local law enforcement. The bill included a provision that required the Defense 
Department to generate a list of all facilities that could be used as detention centers “for felons, 
especially those who are a federal responsibility such as illegal alien and major narcotic 
trafficker” (Hernandez 2013, 401). Additionally, the 1986 ADAA introduced the immigration 
detainer, by authorizing state and local police to request that (then) Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) detain anyone arrested for drug crimes who is believed to be 
undocumented (Hernandez 2013, 402). Furthermore, a later 1988 iteration of the ADAA under 
George H. W. Bush allowed for the creation of a project via the Investigative Division of the INS 
to coordinate communication between local law enforcement and the agency on matters 
pertaining to the detention and deportation of suspected undocumented immigrants charged with 
narcotic crimes (Hernandez 2013, 405).  
Furthermore, ICE’s Criminal Alien Program is the oldest and largest interface between 
federal immigration enforcement and local criminal justice policy. CAP was initially created as a 
response to the 1986 Immigrant Control and Reform Act’s mandate that any “alien who is 
convicted of an offense which makes the alien subject to deportation” must have their 
deportation proceeding initiated as “expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction” 
(American Immigration Council 2013). It marked a centering of enforcement priorities on 
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criminal history (Macias-Rojas 2016, 11). Furthermore, a later expansion of CAP under the 1996 
IIRIRA incentivized “local law enforcement’s cooperation in detaining and deporting 
noncitizens with criminal records” (Macias-Rojas 2016, 63).  
 This historical confluence of immigration detention with larger carceral policies directly 
influenced the use of state and local jail facilities for detention space during shortages of 
available federal bed space. For example, as a response to the bed space shortage caused by the 
expansion of prison demand caused by the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control bill, the Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP) developed a strategy to maintain “cooperative agreements with state and local 
facilities to provide bed space” that was directly inspired by and based on the INS’s “historic use 
of nonservice facilities”, or facilities to hold federal detainees that are not necessarily owned and 
operated by the federal government (Macias-Rojas 2016, 55). The federal government, via the 
INS, started to initiate such nonservice facility contracts in the wake of their 1981 decision to 
abandon its prior practice of nondetention, and instead institute “an internal policy of detaining 
all deportable migrants, including those seeking asylum” (Macias-Rojas 2016, 55). The use of 
nonservice facility contracts by the INS to meet the sudden increase in demand for immigrant 
detention space began with partnerships between the federal government and “small boarding 
houses,” growing to later include agreements with “local jails and larger corporations”, notably 
the detention of some Cuban asylum seekers in the Atlanta Penitentiary (Macias-Rojas 2016, 
56).  
Scholar Cheryl Little (1999) outlines the history of the INS’s use of nonservice facilities 
in Florida, to reveal a procedure rife with opacity and ambiguities. There, the INS used county 
jail space as overflow beds for immigrant detainees in during periods when the overcrowding of 
the federally-operated Krome detention center was leading to public controversy and the 
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potential for disease outbreak. Mail correspondence dated back to 1995 from then Krome 
Administrator Constance K. Weiss specifically referred to the transfer of detainees to 
“nonservice facilities upstate” as a means of rendering these detainees “stashed out of sight for 
cosmetic purposes” (Little 1999, 556). Problems quickly arose from this collaboration, namely 
due to the fact that the terms of the actual language of the agreements between the federal 
government and the county were markedly “incomplete,” and provided minimal requirements or 
guidance to the county officials as to how to treat this distinct population (Little 1999, 566). In 
fact, these county jails that hosted immigrant detainees were relatively free from oversight on 
both sides: they evaded both public scrutiny and did not receive much attention from INS 
officials themselves, allowing for large amounts of county discretion over federally detained 
individuals (Little 1999, 565).  
This procedure, a major step in the devolution of immigration enforcement to the local 
level, has led to the contemporary development of incredibly localized practices for responding 
to immigrants. Additionally, this legislative history of “crimmigration” policies means that many 
of the consequences of mass incarceration can specifically be connected to and found within the 
context of immigration detention in particular. These connections are non-trivial: For example, 
detainees in prisons (Gottschalk 2014) and detention centers (Loyd and Mountz 2018) both face 
the likelihood of being transferred to facilities that are spatially remote and far away from their 
family and homes. Detainees in both facilities are prone to psychosocial consequences as a result 
of their incarceration (Ackerman and Furman 2013, Haney 2001). The prominence of 
immigration enforcement in the day-to-day operations of law enforcement, and the social 
criminalization that immigrant populations face as a result of this, has demonstrable 
consequences for both immigrant residents and the municipal officials who serve them. 
10 
 
Individuals with ICE detainers have a significantly larger length-of-stay than a citizen in the 
criminal justice system (Beckett and Evans, 2015).  Local law enforcement have responded to 
pressure to enforce immigration policy by establishing racialized practices that 
disproportionately target Latinos in their communities (Armenta, 2017).  
The Contemporary Immigration Detention System: An Empirical Summary 
 This history of the development of immigration detention, and all of its intersections with 
the larger federal carceral infrastructure, has led to the creation of an incredibly dense, opaque, 
and complex national detention network. The IGSA is only one type of facility that ICE calls 
upon to incarcerate immigrants nationally, as the description of immigrant book-in data from the 
Transnational Records Clearing House (2009) illustrates. 
Contract detention facilities are large, privately owned and operated detention centers 
dedicated exclusively to the housing of immigrants. They are contracted exclusively between a 
private prison contractor and ICE: an example includes the large Houston Contract Detention 
Facility in Texas, contracted to private prison company CoreCivic. While contract detention 
facilities are used for more long-term detention, ICE also operates a large network of at least 186 
unlisted, suburban holding and staging facilities. Such facilities are even more opaque in their 
operations than standard detention centers: they are often unmarked from the outside, and this, 
coupled with a lack of any real-time database for tracking detainees, means that it is notoriously 
difficult to locate detainees housed in these temporary holding facilities (Stevens, 2009). 
Additionally, the national immigrant detention network includes juvenile facilities reserved for 
the housing of minors. Such juvenile facilities are sometimes operated by religious or nonprofit 
organizations, other times by ICE or the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). 
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 In addition to these facilities that are dedicated solely to the detention of immigrants, ICE 
will also reserve portions of pre-existing carceral facilities for additional immigrant detention 
space. The IGSA facility falls into this category: although IGSAs with municipalities have been 
used to form separate, dedicated immigrant detention facilities such as the aforementioned South 
Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, their intended use is to reserve space in local jails and 
prisons for immigrant detainees. In addition to IGSA facilities, ICE will sometimes utilize space 
in facilities owned and operated by the Bureau of Prisons to detain individuals who have not 
been convicted, but whose immigration status is still in question. Furthermore, ICE will 
sometimes “piggyback” off of existing federal contracts with local jails, namely those previously 
initiated by the United States Marshall Service (USMS), for extra detention space as well. This 
complex web of different detention entities has grown tremendously within the past two decades. 
Despite a net decrease in migration from Mexico and apprehensions at the border, prosecutions 
for immigration violations like illegal entry have increased over the last decade (Gottschalk 
2014, 216). The total number of immigrants who are detained each year doubled from 200,000 in 
2001 to more than 400,000 people in 2010 (Gottschalk 2014, 219). Additionally, 2018 saw the 
highest annual average detainees in over a decade, with an average of over 42,000 immigrants in 
custody per day (Sands 2018). Private contractors play a large role in ICE’s immigration 
detention infrastructure: over three-fourths of detainees are held in facilities that are contracted 
out to private companies (Luan 2018). In fact, CoreCivic’s percentage of total revenue from ICE 
nearly doubled concurrent with a surge in Central American migration that began in 2013: rising 
from 13% in 2014 to 28% in 2016 (Macaraeg 2017). Yet sub-national governments also play a 
central role, sometimes in conjunction with private contractors. Of the over 40,000 daily 
detainees, more than 70% are held in state and local prisons pursuant to IGSA agreements, 
12 
 
making the IGSA contract an understudied but incredibly prominent piece of immigration policy 
in the country (Kerwin and Lin, 2009). 
Controversial Contracts: Criticisms of ICE’s Use of IGSAs 
 According to one statement by the Department of Justice (DOJ), IGSAs are used 
by both ICE and the USMS to make up for a shortage of detention space at the federal level, by 
using state and local facilities for additional bed-space (Office of the Inspector General, 2007). 
But IGSAs do not always simply use excess capacity within local jails. Critics of the procedure 
note their potential for abuse: because they are agreements between different levels of 
government (in this case, a federal agency and a municipal government), they allow ICE to skirt 
the requirement for an open, transparent bid process for federal contracts, while still involving 
private contractors to run detention facilities. Without the involvement of local governments as 
party to these contracts, ICE would be required to host an open period where companies can 
publicly bid on federal contracts prior to their finalization, a requirement meant to ensure a 
degree of transparency in the contract creation process (Velez, 2019). Attorney Mark Fleming of 
the National Immigrant Justice Center refers to IGSAs as “fraudulent contracts to allow ICE to 
float money to a private company to avoid federal procurement laws” (Urevich, 2018). 
Furthermore, critics of these no-bid contracts suggest that their structure allows for ICE to avoid 
legal culpability for any instances of abuse in their facilities, by funneling such culpability to 
private enterprises and local governments (Urevich, 2018). Since IGSAs are clearly both 
common and controversial, what motivates municipalities to take part? Previous literature, which 
will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 2, generates several hypotheses about why local 
officials might take part in welcoming or restrictive practices toward immigrants. The political 
ideology of a municipality, for example, has been found to be strongly associated with the tenor 
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of their immigration policies: Republican districts tend to hew towards restrictive policies, 
whereas Democratic ones tend to pass more accommodating and welcoming policies (Wong 
2012, Williamson 2018, Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). Regional economic factors are also 
hypothesized to affect local detention decisions, as scholars have posited a theoretical link 
between economic instability and the growth of the penal state (Wacquant 2010, Simon 1989, 
Andreas 2000). Demographic factors, such as the population of foreign-born residents and Latino 
residents in a municipality, are also hypothesized to increase restrictive immigration policies at 
the local level, such as collaborations with ICE through the 287(g) program (Hopkins 2010, 
Wong 2012, Svajlenka 2018), though the presence of a visible foreign-born Latino population 
may also make localities more likely to implement accommodating practices to address the 
newcomers (Williamson 2018). None of this literature on municipal motivations, however, tests 
these hypotheses in the context of local decisions to collaborate with ICE through IGSA 
detention contracts.  
Purpose of Thesis and Preview of Methods 
 This project, with the help of a recently FOIA-requested dataset on ICE’s detention 
spaces across the county, will begin to address the dearth of information on municipal decision-
making surrounding IGSA detention contracts. Chapter 1 will use quantitative methods to 
examine all IGSA facilities that held detainees between 2015 and 2017. In addition to 
cataloguing and mapping the distribution of these facilities across the country, bivariate tests will 
determine whether pre-existing hypotheses on what factors influence local immigration policy 
also work to explain the distribution of IGSAs across the country. On the basis of this analysis, 
Chapter 1 will demonstrate that the patterns of IGSA placement across the country challenge the 
existing literature on municipal responses to immigrants in some surprising respects (IGSAs are 
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distributed heavily in certain Democratic strongholds) while corroborating long-held theories on 
immigration policy responses in other respects (IGSA contracts are more prevalent in places with 
higher foreign-born populations, a finding that could potentially be interpreted to align with the 
“ethnic threat” theory of immigration policy, but namely suggests that proximity to the foreign-
born is associated with policies related to them).  
While Chapter 1 presents the distribution of IGSAs, Chapter 2 looks to specific cases to 
examine the processes driving initiation and terminations. It examines a sample of 20 recent 
IGSA facility closures and openings using a systemic qualitative investigation into local news 
archives, to determine what factors were shared among different examples of IGSA contract 
termination and initiation. On the basis of this analysis, Chapter 2 will reveal common methods 
for IGSA facility siting, like ICE’s tendency to target municipalities who have previously 
collaborated with the federal government via the USMS or the BOP. It will additionally reveal 
the myriad of ambiguities and risks associated with local participation in IGSA contracts: these 
agreements can end suddenly due to the whims of a private contractor or ICE themselves; they 
can attract protest from state and local activists; and they can come with vague and unclear 
expectations that lead to inconsistent application of detention practices at the local level. 
 Overall, however, this thesis reveals how the complexity of the national detention 
network, coupled with ICE’s notorious secrecy surrounding these operations, makes thorough 
examination incredibly difficult to realize (Cullen, 2018). Despite these obstacles, shining a light 
on this system is essential. ICE detention facilities face serious allegations of human rights 
abuses1, yet towns and counties across the nation are increasingly signing on to take part in 
                                                          
1 Outside the scope of this project, but certainly crucial to acknowledge when considering detention policy in any 
form, is the demonstrable regularity of abuse allegations against federal workers in ICE and CBP detention facilities. 
For further reading on the subject, the May 2018 report “Neglect and Abuse of Unaccompanied Immigrant Children 
by U.S. Customs and Border Protection” from the American Civil Liberties Union chronicles a pattern of abuse of 
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IGSA agreements. This thesis provides initial evidence of their motivations and the 
consequences they may face in response.  
  
                                                          
unaccompanied migrant children between 2009 to 2014, over a quarter of which pertained to accusations of physical 
abuse (including sexual assault and the use of stress positions). Alice Speri’s reporting for The Intercept similarly 
documents how the DHS Department of the Inspector General received over 33,000 allegations of abuse in ICE 
detention between 2010 and 2016.  
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Chapter 1: Explaining The National Distribution of IGSA Detention Facilities  
 While IGSA contracts are one of the most common forms of immigration detention in the 
country, their ubiquity is matched by their controversies. This chapter will open by describing 
common criticisms levied against IGSA agreements. It will then outline hypotheses from 
scholarly literature that could potentially explain the growth of these detention centers in spite of 
the controversial nature of these contracts. Finally, using bivariate analyses of a comprehensive 
dataset of all ICE detention facilities in the country from 2015 to 2017, it will test how well these 
hypotheses comport to the existing distribution of IGSA facilities.  
About the Data 
This analysis employs the most comprehensive dataset of detention center contracts, the 
product of a series of FOIA requests from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center as a part of their 
research on sanctuary cities. The data has been cleaned and publicized by the National 
Immigrant Justice Center. The dataset originally included all detention facilities (from contract 
detention centers, to BOP and ORR facilities, in addition to holding facilities in hospitals and 
airports), with the notable exception of CBP detention facilities. This analysis examines only the 
IGSA facilities. Specifically, it examines only the IGSA facilities that were logged as having 
some kind of book-ins between the years 2015 to 2017, or “active” IGSAs: 360 facilities in total.  
It is worth noting that, while these contracts can be made with both city and county-level 
officials, the vast majority of these contracts are with counties (likely because it is generally the 
norm for counties, not cities, to have jurisdiction over jails). Of the 239 active IGSAs that had 
their facility operator recorded in the dataset, 204 of them (85%) were owned by a county. Thus, 
this chapter will use IGSA facilities per county as the dependent variable for bi-variate analysis.  
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 However, despite criticisms that suggest IGSAs place the burden of legal culpability for 
federal detention on local governments, local governments continue to enter into these 
agreements. In order to determine what factors may be encouraging this growth in the face of 
such controversies, we first must construct a summary of the distribution of all IGSA facilities in 
the country to determine where these agreements are most prevalent.  
National Distribution of IGSAs: 2015 – 2017 
Map 1. Distribution of Active IGSA Facilities in the Country 
 
Source: data via the National Immigrant Justice Center, geocoding services via Google API services, mapping and 
visualization via Tableau. 
 Plotting all the Active IGSA facilities in the country (pictured in Map 1) reveals a notable 
lack of distinct, strong regional clusters of detention centers: a similar density of facilities can be 
observed around the Eastern Seaboard as there is along the Southern Border. It also reveals the 
general ubiquity of these IGSA facilities across the United States, even in the more sparsely 
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populated regions of the country. Perhaps most surprising is the prevalence of IGSAs in areas of 
the country with comparatively lower foreign-born populations, where one would not intuitively 
expect a desire (or need) for a large immigrant detention infrastructure.  
Table 1. States with Highest Number of IGSA Detention Facilities 
State # Active 
IGSAs 
% of Total 
IGSAs 
Texas 42 11.7% 
California 31 8.6% 
Virginia 18 5% 
New York 17 4.7% 
Arizona 13 3.6% 
New Mexico 13 3.6% 
Pennsylvania 12 3.3% 
Colorado 11 3.1% 
Florida 10 2.8% 
Illinois 9 2.5% 
Louisiana 9 2.5% 
Iowa 8 2.2% 
Michigan 8 2.2% 
Montana 8 2.2% 
North Carolina 8 2.2% 
Source: Author’s analysis of National Immigrant Justice Center data 
 As Table 1 demonstrates, of these 360 active facilities, Texas hosts over 11% of them. At 
42 total active IGSAs, Texas is the state that leads the nation in terms of the total number of 
municipalities involved in detention contracts. Of the five states with the highest number of 
IGSAs, three of them are on the southern border, corresponding to trends which generally see 
places exposed to the militarization of the border enacting more restrictive policies (Williamson, 
2018). Also striking is the presence of states with sparse populations, and specifically sparse 
foreign-born populations, that still host a comparatively large number of IGSA contracts, such as 
Iowa and Montana. Notable also are the states that have opted entirely to not participate in any 
IGSA contract. Only three states: Connecticut, Delaware, and Hawaii, have no active IGSA 
facilities whatsoever. Finally, two U.S. Territories are party to IGSA contracted detention 
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facilities as well. The Virgin Islands is home to the St. T Criminal Justice Complex, while the 
Northern Mariana Islands host the Saipan Department of Corrections.  
Figure 1. IGSA Facilities by Mean Annual Book-ins 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation of data from the National Immigrant Justice Center 
 Figure 1 demonstrates that many of the IGSAs in the country have a small detention 
capacity: 35% of active IGSA facilities saw an average detainee book-in population of only 1 to 
30 detainees. Additionally, 9.2% of facilities were practically dormant, with an average of zero 
detainee book-ins from 2015 to 2017. However, there is no shortage of larger facilities that hold 
thousands of detainees at any given time, despite the fact that IGSAs are explicitly intended to 
reserve beds in smaller local jail facilities. 48% of all active IGSA facilities saw an average 
book-in of over 100 detainees, with 17% of all active IGSA facilities (63 facilities) averaging 
over 1000 book-ins from 2015 to 2017.  
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Changes in IGSA Contracts Over Time: 2015 – 2017 
 The preceding descriptive data depicted all IGSA facilities that were open at some point 
between the years 2015 and 2017. However, of the 369 active IGSA facilities, 110 of them 
(29.8% of all active IGSA facilities) showed evidence of either opening or closing during this 
time range. If a facility housed detainees in 2015, but did not do so in later years, they are 
considered to have closed over this period. Similarly, if a facility did not house detainees in an 
earlier year, but saw a non-zero number of detainees in later subsequent years, they are 
considered to have opened over this period. Overall, this process yielded 43 facilities marked as 
having closed at some point between 2015 and 2017, and 67 facilities marked as having opened 
at some point in the same time range.   
Map 2. Distribution of IGSA Closures, 2015 – 2017 
 
Source: data via the National Immigrant Justice Center, geocoding services via Google API services, mapping and 
visualization via Tableau. 
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 Map 2 shows the distribution of all IGSA facilities that stopped seeing detainee book-ins 
at some point between 2015 and 2017. While these closures appear to be more frequent along the 
100-mile border zone on the periphery of the country, there were more IGSA facilities in this 
region to begin with. In sum, closures do not appear to be limited to certain states or regions.  
Table 2. IGSA Closures 2015-2017 By State 
State # Closures 
California 5 
Montana 4 
New York 4 
Virginia 4 
Louisiana 3 
New Mexico 3 
Colorado 2 
Oregon 2 
Texas 2 
Arkansas 1 
Arizona 1 
Illinois 1 
Michigan 1 
Missouri 1 
North 
Carolina 
1 
North Dakota 1 
Ohio 1 
Pennsylvania 1 
Rhode Island 1 
Utah 1 
Virgin Islands 1 
Vermont 1 
Wisconsin 1 
West Virginia 1 
 
 Table 2 further disambiguates and specifies the locations of these facility closures, with 
California featuring the highest number of closures (five total) in the two-year time period. This 
is to be expected considering that California has one of the highest numbers of IGSA facilities to 
begin with – a higher number of closures is simply proportional to the large total number of 
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facilities in the state. Additionally, three states saw four facility closures over the studied time-
period: Montana, New York, and Virginia, all of which are states that had the highest number of 
active IGSA contracts as depicted in Table 1.  
Map 3. Distribution of IGSA Openings, 2015 – 2017 
 
 Map 3 shows the spatial distribution of all facilities that went from no recorded book-ins 
to having a non-zero number of detainees in the studied time period between 2015 and 2017. The 
majority of instances of new facility openings are in the central United States, with many more 
openings taking place outside the 100-mile border zone, which is interesting when juxtaposed 
with the fact that many of the facility closures from the same time period seemed to cluster 
around that very periphery. On the other hand, as Table 3 demonstrates, Texas led the country in 
terms of newly inaugurated IGSA facilities with eight new contracts between 2015 and 2017. 
Texas is followed by Virginia with five new facilities, and Colorado, Louisiana, and New 
Mexico with four new facilities.  
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Table 3. IGSA Openings 2015 – 2017 By State 
State # Openings 
Texas 8 
Virginia 5 
Colorado 4 
Louisiana 4 
New Mexico 4 
California 3 
Iowa 3 
Illinois 3 
New York 3 
South Dakota 3 
Washington 3 
Arkansas 2 
Arizona 2 
Florida 2 
North Dakota 2 
New Jersey 2 
Pennsylvania 2 
Utah 2 
Georgia 1 
Kansas 1 
Minnesota 1 
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
1 
Mississippi 1 
Nebraska 1 
Nevada 1 
Oklahoma 1 
Oregon 1 
Vermont 1 
Wisconsin 1 
 
 This glimpse at the national distribution of IGSA contracts reveals many questions that 
prompt further investigation. For instance, why do two prominently Democratic states – CT and 
CA – that both have state ordinances banning compliance with ICE detainers in jails (“trust 
acts”) have such a stark difference in the number of IGSAs within their borders? How does 
California manage to have such a high number of IGSA facilities when their state government 
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has pre-empted cooperation with detainers through their state sanctuary ordinance? Indeed, the 
national distribution of IGSAs appears to demonstrate some unintuitive findings that need further 
systematic confirmation: namely, the prominence of these contracts in largely Democratic states, 
and the frequency of these agreements’ initiation in the interior of the country. The following 
section will see whether the trends demonstrated in the maps of national IGSA distribution are 
indeed present, and to what extent, by performing a series of bi-variate analyses to determine 
precisely what factors influence the number of IGSAs per county in a state.  
Preliminary Testing of Hypotheses: Bivariate Tests of What Factors Influence IGSAs 
Political Ideology 
The first potential influential factor to investigate is the effect of political ideology on 
IGSA frequency among states. The literature on factors that influence other state and local-level 
immigration policies is the most consistent with regards to the effect of political ideology: 
Findings suggest that local partisan affiliation with the Democratic party is a significant predictor 
of accommodating local policies (Williamson 2018, Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010). Findings 
also demonstrate that this relationship holds in the opposite direction, as local Republican 
affiliation is positively associated with a town’s likelihood to partner with ICE through a 287(g) 
agreement (Wong, 2012). However, this literature mainly focuses on local ordinances and 
resolutions. To the extent that it touches upon the likelihood of local governments to partner with 
ICE, it focuses on the ratification of 287(g) agreements (Wong 2012, Svajlenka 2018). 
Therefore, a pertinent question left unanswered is whether partisanship has an effect on the 
likelihood that a local government will participate in an Intergovernmental Service Agreement 
(IGSA) with ICE for the establishment of immigrant detention space. 
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Figure 2. The Effect of State Political Ideology on IGSA Facilities per County 
 
 The plot of the relationship between state partisanship and their ratio of IGSA agreements 
per county reveals unexpected results: demonstrated Republican ideology is associated with less 
IGSA facilities per county, while Democratic states are shown to host more collaborations with 
ICE for detention space. In fact, as Table 4 illustrates, out of the 10 states with the largest ratios 
of IGSAs to counties, only three of them (30%) voted for Trump in the 2016 General Election. 
This appears to show a relationship between political ideology and IGSA detention center 
frequency that challenges the existing literature: the majority of states with high IGSAs per 
county are Democratic. This unexpected correlation is moderately strong, with a correlation 
coefficient of -.38, and has a fair amount of explanatory power: the R-squared value of .141 
suggests that political ideology (as operationalized through 2016 presidential election results) 
can account for up to 14% of the variation in state-level IGSA frequency.  
 
r = -.38 
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Table 4. Political Ideology Among States with Highest IGSA Facilities per County 
State 
% Trump 
Vote 2016 
IGSA Per 
County 
AZ 0.50 0.81 
CA 0.33 0.53 
NM 0.40 0.38 
MA 0.34 0.33 
VT 0.33 0.33 
NJ 0.42 0.32 
NY 0.38 0.27 
AK 0.53 0.20 
UT 0.46 0.20 
OR 0.41 0.19 
Cells in the % Trump Vote column are shaded blue (Clinton) or red (Trump) to signify who won the largest share of 
the vote in each state. 
Source: Author’s interpretation of dataset from National Immigrant Justice Center, Politico 2016 Election Results, 
American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates 2012-2016 via Social Explorer  
Detention Economics  
Scholars of the history of immigrant detention have traced the economic history of the 
detainment economies in border counties. Macias-Rojas 2016 details how prison construction 
was critical to the local economies of struggling border towns in the 70s and 80s. She 
specifically cites the three Arizona localities of Douglas, Bisbee, and Nogales, where prison 
construction was spurred by the general decline in industries like “mining, agriculture, and 
retail” and the specific loss of the Phelps Dodge Corporation in the area in 1987 (Macias-Rojas 
2016, 27-28). Such events have led to some to posit a theoretical link between economic 
instability and the growth of the penal state (Wacquant 2010, Simon 1989, Andreas 2000). This 
hypothesis has been specifically applied to immigration policy actions at the federal level, as 
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Andreas (2000) posits a link between trade policies that spurred capital flight from the U.S. in 
the 1990s to increases in border enforcement actions. Literature also suggests that policymakers 
systematically site “inferior public goods” like prisons to more economically lagged areas 
(Cherry and Kunce 2001). This hypothesis is also present anecdotally, in contemporary examples 
of de-industrialized towns like Youngstown, Ohio struggling to balance the entrepreneurial 
contributions of new immigrant populations with their relative dependence on the revenue and 
employment gleaned through immigrant detention centers (Small, 2019).  
 Therefore, this literature on economic desperation and the development of local prison 
economies would suggest that IGSA contracts would be associated with higher levels of 
economic need. In this analysis, two measurements of a state’s economic vitality are used: 
median household income in 2016, and the state-level unemployment rate (U3) in 2016.  
Figure 3. The Effect of Unemployment on IGSA Facilities per Capita 
 
 
r = .19 
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Figure 4. The Effect of Median Household Income on IGSAs per Capita 
 
 The scatterplot comparing state-level unemployment in 2016 to IGSA contract frequency 
shows a relationship in the expected direction, given the literature: states with higher aggregate 
unemployment rates see higher frequencies of IGSA contracts among their counties. The results 
from the scatterplot on unemployment may also help to explain some of the unexpected results 
for political ideology: many of the prominently Democratic states that have high IGSAs per 
capita are also ones that have higher unemployment. Notably New Jersey – which has come 
under fire for its heavy use of IGSA contracts in multiple large counties like Hudson County, 
which made the controversial decision to renew its IGSA in July of 2018 (Katz 2018).  
 The other test of an economic variable, however, produced a result in an unexpected 
direction: states with higher median household incomes tended to have higher frequencies of 
IGSA contracts per county. This can partially be explained by the fact that many of the states 
with higher unemployment also happen to have higher median incomes – California and New 
r = .21 
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Jersey both being notable examples. This relationship may also be a sign that common census 
data categories can only go so far to act as a proxy for the specific kinds of local economic need 
that may be more closely associated with IGSA contract initiations. Specifically, the structure of 
IGSA contracts (providing a per-diem or yearly rate to the municipal budget) means that they 
help to supplement local government revenues, rather than individual ones. Therefore, the 
unexpected direction of the median household income model could also be explained by its 
limited ability to capture the specific local economic conditions that IGSA contracts affect more 
prominently.  
Speculation about the causes of expected or unexpected directions is only so useful, 
however, given the fact that both of these correlations appear to be relatively low-strength with 
low explanatory power. Both plots have weak positive correlations, with the median household 
income scatterplot (Figure 6) having a Pearson’s r of .21, while the unemployment scatterplot 
shows an even slightly weaker correlation strength with a Pearson’s r of .19. Furthermore, the 
explanatory power of both independent variables is quite weak as well. The R-squared value of 
the relationship between median household income and IGSA facilities per county is .028, 
meaning that only 2.8% of the total variation in IGSA frequency between states can be explained 
by median household income. Similarly, the R-squared value of the relationship between state 
unemployment and IGSA facilities per county is .035, meaning that only 3.5% of the total 
variation in IGSA frequency can be explained by the state’s unemployment rate.  
Therefore, economic factors do not appear to have much explanatory power vis-à-vis a 
state’s IGSA contract frequency. However, there are still other harder-to-find measurements that 
may prove to be a better measure of the kind of local economic distress that would perhaps be 
better correlated to IGSA frequency, such as county revenue from taxes. More iterations of 
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economically-grounded hypotheses should be tested to clarify this study’s ambiguous bivariate 
test results.  
Demographics and Detention 
 Scholarly literature on local responses to immigrants is divided on the degree to which 
certain demographic factors influence municipal policy. Some scholars have confirmed iterations 
of Blalock’s (1967) ethnic threat hypothesis, which posits that restrictive local responses to 
immigrants are a response to large growth in foreign-born populations, particularly in contexts 
where immigration is featured heavily in national news coverage (Hopkins 2010). However, 
other studies assert that the proportion of the population that is Latino, and not the proportion of 
the population that is foreign-born, is a more accurate predictor of local responses to 
immigration, specifically decisions to partner with ICE through 287(g) agreements (Wong 2012, 
Svajlenka 2018). Still others dispute the idea that proximity to immigrants, or growth in 
immigrant populations, will always lead to restriction: Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) find that 
increases in Latino populations will correspond to their growth as a political force, while 
Williamson (2018) finds that more visible immigrant populations can lead to more 
accommodation from service-oriented local bureaucrats. 
Given that some studies have found both the proportion of the foreign-born population 
and the proportion of the Latino population to be influential factors on a municipality’s 
collaboration with ICE, the analysis will focus on both the effect of the size of the Latino 
population and the effect of the size of the foreign-born population. Given the tendency of the 
proportion of Latinos and the proportion of foreign-born residents to covary, a proxy for the 
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proportion of Latinos in the state population will be used: the proportion of the foreign-born 
population that are from Latin America2.  
Figure 5. The Effect of Foreign-Born Population on IGSAs per County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Specifically, using the ACS 2016 definition of Latin America in its measurement of the Place of Birth of the 
Foreign-Born Population, which includes the following countries of origin: Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, “Other Central America”, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, “Other South America”, Barbados, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, “Other Caribbean”.  
r = .45 
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Figure 6. Effect of Latino Foreign-Born Population on IGSA per County 
 
As Figure 7 demonstrates, there is a moderate strength correlation (Pearson’s r of .45) 
between the proportion of the state population that is foreign-born and the number of IGSA 
facilities per county in that state. Furthermore, the foreign-born proportion of the population 
appears to have a non-trivial amount of explanatory power; the R-squared of the relationship is 
.208, meaning that over 20% of the variation of states’ IGSA-per-county can be explained by the 
proportion of the state’s foreign-born population. This finding appears to confirm the findings of 
literature that suggests a proximity to immigrant populations may prompt restrictionist policies 
as a reaction. However, given the fact that IGSAs are so prominent in states that are otherwise 
accommodating in their stance towards immigrant populations, such as California and New 
Jersey, it is difficult to say that this finding entirely squares with more threat-based hypotheses in 
the literature.  
r = .21 
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In contrast, as Figure 8 depicts, the relationship between the proportion of the foreign-
born population who are Latino and a state’s IGSA frequency has quite a weaker correlation 
strength (Pearson’s r of .21). Furthermore, the explanatory power of this independent variable is 
weak as well: the R-squared of the relationship is .043, meaning that only 4.3% of the variation 
of state IGSA frequency can be accounted for by the proportion of the foreign-born population 
that is Latino. Surprisingly, this finding challenges the literature on what factors predict local 
partnerships with ICE. While most studies of 287(g) agreements demonstrated that race was a 
more influential factor in predicting a town’s collaboration with ICE enforcement, this data 
seems to suggest that race is a less significant factor in predicting another kind of collaboration 
with ICE: the number of IGSAs per county in a state.  
Lingering Questions on Municipal Motivations, and How to Address Them 
 This chapter has provided a descriptive overview of all actively utilized IGSA contracts 
in the country, including the distribution of IGSA facilities in the country, with a specific focus 
on the distribution of IGSAs that have opened and closed between 2015 and 2017. It also 
revealed the factors that are associated with a higher frequency of IGSAs in any given state, 
some of them challenging existing literature on municipal responses to immigrants: Democratic 
partisanship, a high foreign-born population, and a high unemployment rate. What these 
descriptions leave ambiguous is the question of why a local government would choose to involve 
itself in the traditionally federal domain of immigration policy, particularly when other literature 
finds that municipal governments tend to be more accommodating towards immigrant 
populations (Williamson 2018). What, then, are the unique local-level incentives for partnering 
with ICE, and correspondingly, what are the unique considerations made when a municipality 
decides to terminate their existing IGSAs?  
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 This chapter lays the groundwork for beginning to investigate such questions. 
Specifically, by noting which facilities have opened and closed within the span of 2015 – 2017, a 
systemic investigation into the context of each of those facility openings and closings can begin 
to address the question of what motivates municipal decision-making with respect to becoming 
party to an IGSA. The following chapter will attempt to do just that, compiling and 
systematically coding archived local news coverage of all instances of facility openings and 
closings. Such an analysis will begin to touch upon the questions raised by this chapter’s 
descriptive outlines of IGSA contracts: why is their presence seemingly ubiquitous across the 
country? Why do they appear to be enacted and retracted so frequently across the country? How 
are the pros and cons of such contracts interpreted by municipal decisionmakers?  
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Chapter 2: Case Studies in IGSA Contract Initiation and Termination 
Introduction 
The analysis of IGSA facilities nationally reveals their locations, geographic spread, and 
alludes to certain state-level traits that are correlated with a higher density of IGSA contracts. 
However, these contracts require the approval of municipal governments, and while analyzing 
the geographic spread of contemporary IGSA contracts reveals where certain municipal 
governments have approved such collaborations, it cannot reveal anything about the rationale 
behind this approval. Since IGSA contracts present local governments with revenue (either a 
fixed sum yearly or the much more common “per-diem” agreement that pays local governments 
a certain rate per immigrant detained per day), IGSA contracts present local decisionmakers with 
a complex and controversial choice: weighing the costs of placing the municipality in the cross-
hairs of national immigration activism with the benefits of projected revenue increases. A 
systemic analysis of the reasoning behind IGSA contract approval and termination could begin to 
reveal patterns in how local decisionmakers ultimately end up evaluating these costs and 
benefits. Furthermore, as was alluded to in Chapter 1, the process of initiating these contracts is 
ambiguous, with some suggesting that IGSAs are used to circumvent typical federal contracting 
processes to involve private prison firms (Urevich, 2018). This ambiguity calls for a systematic 
analysis of the process of IGSA contract initiation and termination. Because both immigration 
detention and municipal-level immigration policy are understudied, this research question has the 
potential to contribute to greater understanding in both areas.  
This chapter seeks to investigate what factors motivate the uptake and dissolution of local 
contracts for immigration detention by analyzing the facts of a sample of IGSA closures and 
openings between 2015 and 2017. For each sampled IGSA contract, I collected and coded local 
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journalistic coverage of municipal battles over detention space to outline general trends and 
common details of these processes. The result is instructive initial insights which help to define 
the consequences of such agreements for the day-to-day operations of local decisionmakers, with 
case studies highlighting the economic volatility of these agreements, the variability in 
implementation of such contracts, the contradiction between these agreements and other policies 
such as non-compliance with detainers or state-level pre-empted TRUST acts, and finally, how 
ICE’s sudden decisions to open new detention facilities in the wake of controversies often leaves 
local governments scrambling in the wake of unexpected revenue loss.  
Methods and Notes on Data Inconsistencies 
From the original 68 openings and 44 closures introduced in Chapter 1, I took a stratified 
sample of 20 IGSA openings and 20 closures. The sampling method prioritized larger facilities: 
the first 10 detention centers sampled were those with the largest average book-ins. The 
remaining 58 openings and 34 closings were assigned a random number between 1 and 150 in 
Microsoft Excel, and the 10 facilities with the largest randomly assigned numbers were 
additionally sampled. This sampling method was designed to investigate the processes related to 
the largest detention center openings and closings, as well as a representative sample of smaller 
openings and closings.  
 From there, I researched every detention center in the sample using local news archives. 
Specifically, the name of the detention center as represented in the dataset, alongside the Boolean 
“immigration,” was entered as a search phrase in the following newspaper aggregators: Google 
News, NexisUni (formerly LexisNexis), and Questia (formerly Highbeam). All local news 
articles that discussed the facility’s detainment of immigrants were numbered and archived. Each 
article was read and coded for anything pertaining to the existence of an IGSA contract, and if 
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applicable, the factors surrounding its termination or initiation. Many entries, however, had no 
publicly available information either way and were therefore flagged for further investigation via 
contacting local police departments. A step by step methodological summary for this qualitative 
data gathering project can be found in the appendix following this chapter. 
 Perhaps the most striking and conclusive finding from this phase of the research project 
was the inconsistency of the dataset itself. Out of the 20 potential closures that were sampled for 
this project, just 4 (20%) had publicly available information on the circumstances surrounding 
their closure. The opening facilities saw a higher success rate with this methodology: out of 20 
sampled, 8 (40%) had publicly available information on the circumstances surrounding their 
openings.  
With respect to data inconsistencies, several facilities that were sampled as potential 
openings or closures, upon preliminary research, were confirmed to have not opened or closed 
between 2015 and 2017. Of the 20 sampled potential closures, 5 (25%, more than the proportion 
of the sample that consisted of confirmed closures) were positively confirmed to have not been 
closures at all. Of the 20 sampled potential openings, 5 (25%) were positively confirmed to have 
not been openings at all.  
These facilities were originally flagged as potentially being closures or openings because 
they either started, or stopped, seeing book-ins at some point between 2015 and 2017. However, 
this phase of the research produced some evidence that the ICE’s log of book-ins over time is not 
entirely accurate. Most notably, the Queens House of Detention was flagged as a potential 
opening because it is recorded in the dataset as having gone from zero book-ins in 2015 to four 
book-ins in 2016. However, multiple local newspapers corroborate and confirm that the Queens 
House of Detention has actually been vacant since 2002 (Brand 2018a, Brodsky 2002). The 
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facility is so vacant, in fact, that it was last used as the set for the Netflix original series Orange 
is the New Black (Brand 2018b).  
Other peculiarities revealed by the existence of these confirmed non-closures and non-
openings include the same facility being included multiple times in the dataset under its different 
known names. This was the case for one facility, which represented both one of the five 
confirmed non-closures and one of the five confirmed non-openings: the Pulaski County Jail, 
also known as the Tri-County Detention Center. This facility was listed under the latter name 
with book-ins up until the year 2017, where its entry under the name “Tri-County Detention 
Center” shows 0 book-ins for FY2017, thus producing the conditions needed for this entry to be 
flagged as a potential closure. The entry for the facility under the name “Pulaski County Jail” 
shows no book-ins until FY2017, thus producing the conditions needed for this entry to be 
flagged as a potential opening.  
For instances like these, there are no explanations other than an entry error on the part of 
National Immigrant Justice Center during their compilation of the FOIA requested data, or a 
record keeping problem on the part of ICE itself. Being misrepresented in ICE’s internal records 
poses notable consequences for local governments, particularly as these local governments are 
increasingly in the crosshairs of federal debates on immigration enforcement. For example, when 
ICE released reports that listed municipalities with policies that limit cooperation with the 
agency, it cited Riverside Regional Jail in Virginia as a facility that denies ICE detainers. 
However, officials from Riverside Regional Jail disputed the report’s accuracy (Remmers 2017). 
Indeed, these reports, released shortly after Trump’s Executive Order which promised (among 
other things) to cut funding from “sanctuary cities”, were met with “widespread reports of 
inaccuracies” (Remmers 2017). While it is impossible to know which specific discrepancies 
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discovered within the data during this phase are the responsibility of ICE’s own recordkeeping, it 
is clear that ICE has demonstrably misunderstood its relationship with municipal governments 
before. Such misunderstandings could be consequential for local governments under a federal 
administration with a tangible history of attempting to castigate local governments for non-
cooperation with immigration enforcement.  
Interpreting the Findings: Reasoning Behind IGSA Facility Closures From 2015 – 2017 
Out of 20 sampled closures, only four had publicly available information on the 
circumstances surrounding their closure: the South Louisiana Detention Center (LA), the 
Montgomery County Correctional Facility (PA), the Artesia Family Residential Center (NM), 
and the Fairfax County Jail (VA).  
Table 1. Known IGSA Facility Closures from 2015 – 2017 
Facility Name Who Initiated 
Termination? 
Date of 
Facility 
Opening 
Date of Closure 
Announcement 
South Louisiana Detention Center GEO Group 1993 11/15/2015 
Artesia Family Residential Center DHS/ICE 6/24/2014 11/18/2014 
Montgomery County Correctional 
Facility 
County 5/6/2012 4/28/2014 
Fairfax County Jail County 2012 1/23/2018 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation of dataset from the National Immigrant Justice Center, various local 
news reports found through Google News, NexisUni, and Questia. 
 
 These known closures roughly fall into two types based largely on who initiated the 
process of shuttering the facility. One narrative of IGSA closures sees municipal decisionmakers 
shifting their attitudes about contracting with detention centers as a response to political 
pressures. The other narrative, however, eschews the desires of municipal decisionmakers 
entirely, as they are left to respond to a sudden decision by private contractors or ICE itself to 
terminate the IGSA contract prematurely.   
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Involuntary Closures: Blindsiding Local Governments 
 Analyzing facility closures initiated by either of the non-municipality parties to an IGSA 
contract (ICE or a private contractor) obviously does not reveal anything about the rationale of 
municipal decisionmakers in ending IGSA contracts. However, it does reveal a potential 
consequence of local government participation in an IGSA contract: the possibility of this 
agreement suddenly ending before its proper expiration date, often leaving the municipality with 
fiscal consequences.  
 Of the four confirmed closures, half were not attributable to the decisions of any local 
politician and were instead the product of top-down decisions from either a private prison 
company or ICE itself. These cases demonstrate the unpredictability of these contractual 
agreements, and in doing so, highlight an unintended consequence of such agreements that prove 
incredibly pertinent for local decisionmakers who see prison contracts as a critical revenue 
stream.  
 Representatives from private prison giant GEO Group announced the imminent closure 
of the South Louisiana Detention Facility (also known as the Basile Detention Center) on 
November 18th of 2015, just 8 months after the facility was sold to the private company in 
February by the Louisiana Corrections Services. The terms of the detention center’s operation 
under this new corporate acquisition resulted in “substantial payments to the town of Basile” 
(Lejeune 2015). However, this increase in revenue was short-lived for the town. Representatives 
from GEO Group announced their decision – after the closure was already decided by the 
corporation – to elected officials in a parish-wide meeting. 
 The fact that GEO Group reached out to local decisionmakers after the closure was 
decided, and not during the company-wide negotiations on whether to shutter the detention 
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center, is notable precisely because it demonstrates local governments’ lack of agency to 
influence the private decisions that affect their town’s fiscal solvency. The sudden economic 
spillover effects from this unintended closure were not limited to the lost per-diem revenue 
guaranteed by the contract itself. Rather, it also posed consequences for Basile’s economy in 
other, secondary ways: for example, the closure of the prison facility also led to a decline in local 
spending by the prison and its employees (Lejeune, 2015).  
GEO Group’s official statement about the closure provides no closure for the town 
government left holding the bag: the statement cited no specific reason for the facility’s closure 
other than the fact that “the Pine Prairie facility [a newly opened, also GEO-owned IGSA facility 
in Louisiana] is better suited to accomplish the mission currently being delivered at the South 
Louisiana Correctional Center” (Lejeune 2015). This basic story – a sudden, premature closure 
decision that is justified by higher-ups with fairly opaque official statements – was followed in 
the other involuntary closure studied: that of the Artesia Family Residential Center in Artesia, 
New Mexico.  
The Artesia Family Residential Center was always planned to be a temporary facility, 
established in a retrofitted Federal Law Enforcement Training Campus in June 2014 as a 
response to a surge in immigration of Central American families (Carcamo 2014, Redmon 2014). 
Its lifespan was even more short-lived than anticipated: the facility closure was announced 
November 18, 2014, despite an earlier October Associated Press report citing the claim of one 
government official that Artesia would remain open through the summer of 2015 (McCabe 
2014). Instead, Artesia’s closure was announced less than six months after its establishment, 
even after the facility underwent significant renovations (Carcamo 2014).  
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The rationale for Artesia’s premature closure in the official statement from ICE is 
somewhat counterintuitive, given the fact that it simultaneously cites a decreased demand for 
family detention while marketing the expansion of family detention through the construction of a 
new facility. Artesia was reportedly closed since “the numbers of illegal migrants crossing into 
south Texas [had] gone down considerably” (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2014). Yet, 
this same statement announces the creation of a new family detention facility in south Texas, this 
one privately managed by CoreCivic. The South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley is 
praised -- in the same statement where the Acting Director of ICE noted the lack of demand for 
family detention -- for providing “invaluable surge capacity” for adult migrants with children 
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2014). 
Given the temporary nature of the facility, located in a former training camp for federal 
law enforcement, the need for an eventual transfer of family detention to a more permanent site 
is understandable. The timing of this sudden closure announcement, however, coincided with 
negative national attention on Artesia. The months immediately prior to the closure 
announcement were fraught with controversy surrounding the Obama administration’s practice 
of family detention, with the attention and ire of  national activists particularly centered on the 
Artesia Facility. August alone saw both the detention of an 11-year-old U.S. citizen in the 
facility, and a lawsuit against the federal government from a coalition of immigrant and civil 
rights groups who claimed that the constitutional rights of Artesia’s detainees were being 
violated by the facility’s “fast-track deportation proceedings” (Redmon 2014). 
The statement provided by ICE on its rationale for prematurely closing the Artesia 
facility eschewed any discussion of these aforementioned issues, instead mirroring the statement 
that GEO Group released on the closure of the South Louisiana Detention Facility: highlight the 
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benefits of a newly built IGSA facility, and the ability of this newly constructed facility to better 
meet the current needs of the federal government. Much like GEO Group’s statement on the 
closure of the South Louisiana Detention Facility, ICE’s statement on Artesia mainly focused on 
the advantages of relocating detainees to the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, 
Texas. In either case, both involuntary “closures” were more accurately understood as transfers 
of existing detainees to newer facilities in different locations. In the case of Artesia in particular, 
it was a means of transferring detainees out of a facility that simultaneously happened to be 
garnering significant negative attention on a national level.  
The economic consequences of Artesia’s sudden establishment and subsequent closure on 
the municipality of Artesia are distinct from those prompted by GEO’s decision to close the 
South Louisiana Detention Facility. One local journalist noted that the sudden addition of 
hundreds of detained children, not to mention other new temporary residents that flocked to the 
isolated municipality of Artesia, like pro-bono immigration attorneys, meant that local store 
shelves were “cleared out” of items like diapers and baby formula (Carcamo 2014). Only a few 
months later, as shopkeepers had barely adjusted to the new demand, the facility was closed and 
economic benefits to the town evaporated, leaving fiscal consequences in their wake. 
While the research design did not yield nearly enough cases to statistically analyze the 
findings presented, the details of these two involuntary closure cases raise many further 
hypotheses to be tested empirically by a more comprehensive research design. Specifically, are 
sudden closures systemically correlated with national-level controversies? What happens to a 
municipality after the involuntary termination of its IGSA contract revenues? Are most other 
top-down closure decisions accompanied by the creation of a newer, larger detention facility? 
Are there systemic microeconomic consequences to the establishment and termination of IGSAs, 
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like the sudden spike and subsequent drop in consumer demand seen in the town of Artesia? 
These cases do not reveal much about the originally intended research question of this study, 
however. That is, they say nothing about the common reasons that municipal decisionmakers cite 
when they, and not ICE or GEO Group, decide to terminate their IGSA agreements. The other 
half of the confirmed closures can begin to reveal how local leaders came to the decision to end 
their collaboration with ICE.  
Shifting Municipal Attitudes: Decisionmaker Responses to External Political Pressure 
Fairfax County’s contract was launched in 2012, and the terms of the agreement allowed 
the county jail to hold inmates up to 48 hours beyond their release date if they are facing 
deportation (Olivo, 2018). This prompts the question of why certain county jails enter into IGSA 
agreements, while others are simply asked to comply with detainer requests to hold certain 
individuals beyond 48 hours without formally registering their jail facility as a “detention 
center”. The only local news article found did not elaborate on the initial rationale to green light 
the IGSA, but quoted then-Sheriff Stacey A. Kincaid on the rationale surrounding the 
agreement’s termination: “We intend to follow all federal obligations as they pertain to ICE … 
We found it expedient to no longer have an agreement that required us to extend our resources 
beyond these obligations” (Olivo 2018). The new jail policy in the wake of the IGSA termination 
is to detain individuals beyond their criminal sentences only in the event that the jail is issued a 
formally court-issued, criminal detainer. This type of anti-detainer provision is considered by 
some, including the Trump Administration, to be the policy of a “sanctuary” city, however there 
is no clearly defined legal definition for what constitutes a sanctuary city.   
Sheriff Kincaid did not explicitly mention what exactly made the Sheriff’s Office 
terminate the IGSA and move toward the opposite extreme. However, a local journalist noted 
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that the Fairfax County IGSA had, in the month prior to the decision by Sheriff Kincaid, come 
under national scrutiny: specifically, the county’s detention policies were criticized in a report 
from ThinkProgress. Relatedly, the decision to terminate the IGSA contract a month following 
this national scrutiny drew subsequent praise from immigration advocates and from county 
politicians – the chair of the county board of supervisors specifically noted that she was 
“pleased” with the decision to distance the Fairfax County law enforcement’s job from that of 
“federal immigration officials.” The story of Fairfax County’s termination is one that 
corresponds to a more intuitive narrative of political decision-making, where local 
decisionmakers act to mitigate outrage or controversy and, subsequently, maintain their elected 
positions. 
The case of Fairfax County’s IGSA contract termination reveals another truth about these 
contracts: the variation in the local decisionmakers with jurisdiction over the contract itself. 
IGSAs are not always overseen by local legislators, rather, as the case of Fairfax County 
demonstrates, sometimes they are under the purview of just the County Sheriff. This has 
implications for how democratic these contractual arrangements can be: while Fairfax County 
has elections to fill the position of sheriff, other municipal law enforcement leadership positions 
are appointed, depending on variations in local policy. 
 The termination of the Montgomery County Correctional Facility’s IGSA in eastern 
Pennsylvania is similar to that of Fairfax County, insofar as the contract was met with visible 
backlash from immigration advocates. It differs, however, in the manner in which the contract 
was “terminated” in the first place. Rather than explicitly overturning the contract, Montgomery 
County enacted a sanctuary policy two years after the initiation of the IGSA, leading to 
confusion upon implementation in the wake of these two contradictory local policies.  
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The IGSA to detain immigrants in the Montgomery County Correctional Facility was 
initiated by county commissioners (as opposed to the local Sheriff) in 2012. The initiation of the 
contract was met with protests outside the jail led by a state-wide undocumented activist 
organization, DreamActivist PA, protests that garnered local press attention for the arrest of 
multiple participants (Myers 2012).  
However, in April 2014, Montgomery County Correctional Facility adopted a non-
cooperation policy for ICE detainers (Hickey 2018). Specifically, the policy shifted to only allow 
for a detainee to be held for an additional 4 hours after the end of their criminal sentence – that 
four hours being “the approximate time it takes for a person to be processed out of the facility” 
according to then Senior Assistant County Solicitor Nicole Forzato (Nadolny 2017). This 
situation raises the questions of how IGSA contracts are treated in the event of the later adoption 
of a municipal sanctuary policy – a confusing question that Montgomery County itself has 
struggled to answer for itself.  
In an article detailing the tendency of plainclothes ICE agents to make arrests near the 
county’s courthouse, a journalist describes how Montgomery County is “listed as a sanctuary 
county, but is not functioning as one”, with inconsistent applications of policies surrounding 
ICE’s access to county facilities, and one case of a 25 year-old Mexican national being arrested 
by ICE from the County Correctional facility after the enaction of this sanctuary policy (Hickey 
2018). However, there does exist evidence that the new non-cooperation policy for detainers is 
implemented at least some of the time, as Montgomery County was the subject of an ICE press 
release that criticized the county for releasing an undocumented “Guatemalan national” from 
their custody (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2016).  
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The case of these two municipally-led closures reveal how the ambiguities of IGSAs 
translate into real inconsistencies in local implementation. In Montgomery County, tensions 
upon the initiation of an IGSA contract morphed into tensions between conflicting municipal 
policies: the correctional facility’s status as an IGSA with the introduction of a new correctional 
facility “sanctuary” policy. In Fairfax County, changes in jail policy on detention reveal the 
ambiguity inherent in the classification of “detention center” in the first place. Under the IGSA 
agreement, Fairfax County held immigrant detainees with deportation orders up to 48 hours 
beyond their criminal sentence, prompting the question of what is the practical difference 
between a formally contracted IGSA facility, and a jail that simply honors detainer requests for 
48 hours without such a contract being established.  
Conclusion: What does this sample of IGSA closures reveal?  
The four closure case studies reveal two substantially different stories of IGSA contract 
terminations. These two narratives both show the volatility of these agreements and point to a 
more general trend of constant facility rotation: new detention centers are created by ICE to then 
liquidate the old ones, and new contracts are initiated as responses to losing local detention space 
when municipalities decide the contract is not worth the negative publicity. It also reveals a wide 
variation in the municipal officials who are charged with overseeing these decisions on IGSAs 
and how the opacity of these agreements produces inconsistent implementation on the local 
level. In Fairfax County, jurisdiction over their IGSA contract remained solely in the hands of 
the county sheriff, whereas the decision to initially negotiate with ICE in Montgomery County 
was made by the county commissioners. Finally, it reveals that IGSAs are agreements riddled 
with ambiguities and inconsistencies: they are prone to sudden termination from private 
contractors or ICE, and they sometimes exist anachronistically alongside municipal sanctuary 
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policies, leaving localities to react to a slew of contradictory directives from varying levels of 
governments and implement decisions inconsistently as a result.  
The next section of this chapter, which analyzes the common themes among the newly 
initiated contracts found between 2015 and 2017, can help us begin to understand how ICE 
recuperates the local detention spaces lost when local governments decide the political risk of the 
detention facility outweigh the revenue received. These cases of recent IGSA contract initiations 
can begin to outline the various iterations of processes by which a locality can be asked to host 
federal immigrant detainees.  
Interpreting the Findings: Reasoning Behind IGSA Facility Openings from 2015 – 2017 
 Out of the 20 facilities sampled from the 68 total openings, 8 facilities were confirmed by 
local news sources to have opened (or initiated their contract) between 2015 – 2017.  
Table 2. Known IGSA Facility Openings Between 2015 and 2017 
Name State 
Pine Prairie Correctional Center LA 
Prairieland Detention Facility TX 
Kankakee County Jail (Jerome Combs) IL 
Cibola County Correctional Center NM 
Folkston ICE Processing Center (D. Ray James) GA 
Cache County Jail UT 
Livingston County Jail NY 
Beaver County Jail PA 
Source: Author’s interpretation of National Immigrant Justice Center Data 
How Localities are Targeted: The Importance of Pre-existing Federal Relationships 
Half of the known openings listed in Table 2 grew to house immigrant detainees because 
ICE targeted a prior relationship that the facility had with the Federal government: either BOP or 
the USMS. This represents another strategy utilized by ICE to expedite the process of finding 
and securing new detention space, in addition to revealing how local governments are coerced 
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into accepting ICE detainees even if they did not explicitly sign a contract with ICE to do so 
through clauses present in most USMS contracts.  
Cibola: CoreCivic Maintains Profits in the Face of Malpractice  
On October 26th, 2016, ICE announced the opening of a new detention center in the 
1,129-bed recently closed Cibola County Correctional Facility in western New Mexico. The 
facility was opened via an IGSA with Cibola County and CoreCivic (Macaraeg 2017). The 
contract legally established Cibola County as an entity to transfer payments from ICE to 
CoreCivic through a two-fold agreement that included one contract between the county and ICE, 
and another subcontract between the county and CoreCivic. Nearly all of the $150 million 
dollars of compensation outlined in the contract is routed to CoreCivic, with the county only 
taking a “miniscule portion of the funds as an administrative fee”: $0.50 per detainee, per day, to 
the county fund (Macaraeg 2017). Compare this to the flat-rate (that is, not dependent on the 
influx of detainees) of $2.5 million dollars funneled monthly to CoreCivic. The terms of this 
particular contract were made public via a New Mexico public records act, a fact that potentially 
could help explain the variation in the available information during this research. Indeed, one of 
the other most well-reported facilities in the sample of closures was also a facility sited in New 
Mexico: the Artesia Family Residential Center (Macaraeg 2017). 
This new contract was negotiated within three months of the Cibola County Correctional 
Facility’s closure as a federal BOP facility. Specifically, CoreCivic’s first contract for the 
building was severed by the Bureau of Prisons in July 2016, in the wake of three publicly 
reported deaths from medical neglect, and the wider context of a federal mandate to mitigate the 
use of private prison contractors at the federal level (Wessler 2016). Prior to its controversial 
closure, the former BOP facility was one of 11 across the country that was used to hold 
50 
 
noncitizens convicted of crimes (Wessler 2016). The case of this sudden termination, then re-
initiation, of an agreement to house federal detainees in the Cibola County Correctional Facility, 
demonstrates how quickly ICE acts to expand federal detention space into vacant properties with 
former ties to BOP.  
Similarly, the Folkston ICE Processing Center was created through the repurposing of an 
unused wing of a privately-owned BOP facility, the D. Ray James Correctional Complex 
(Gardner 2016). The 780-bed wing of the prison remained idle since its purchase by GEO Group; 
it was one of many properties acquired when GEO Group purchased Cornell Corrections 
(Correctional News 2016). The 5-year IGSA agreement between ICE, the county, and GEO 
Group, was initiated at a convenient time: it was a means of offsetting a recent reduction in the 
maximum federal detainees held in the BOP-operated D. Ray James prison, from 1962 beds to 
1800 (Gardner 2016).  
USMS “Piggyback” Contracts in Beaver County and Livingston County 
 In addition to this trend wherein ICE sites potential IGSAs in vacant locations with pre-
existing ties to BOP, the analysis of the openings revealed another mechanism by which ICE 
uses pre-existing carceral relationships with federal agencies to initiate new contracts. Two of the 
opening cases, Beaver County Jail and Livingston County, initiated their IGSA contracts by 
means of a “piggyback contract,” where ICE attaches agreements for immigrant detention beds 
onto pre-existing USMS agreements. While the local news coverage of both of the openings in 
the sample had few details on the nature of the specific clauses in Beaver and Livingston 
counties, language from other IGSAs reveal roughly how the language of USMS agreements lay 
the foundation for such sudden new agreements with other federal agencies. A 2007 IGSA 
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agreement between the USMS and the City of Alexandria, VA, includes the following clause at 
the start of the contract:  
The population hereinafter referred to as "federal detainees”, will be individuals in the 
custody of the USMS, BOP or ICE as applicable. The USMS is the cognizant agency and 
only with the USMS's explicit concurrence may another Federal agency (BOP or ICE) 
piggyback the agreement. 
 
The Local Government shall accept and provide for the secure custody, safekeeping, 
housing, subsistence and care of federal detainees in accordance with state and local laws, 
standards and procedures, or court orders applicable to the operations of the facility, 
consistent with federal law, policies and regulations. 
 
In other words, the language of the agreement establishes that the USMS can approve of 
any other federal carceral agency – the BOP or the ICE – placing detainees in Alexandria’s 
correctional facilities. Note also that the agreement obligates the local government to “accept and 
provide for the secure custody, safekeeping, housing, subsistence, and care of federal detainees,” 
with federal detainees being explicitly described as “individuals in custody of the USMS, BOP, 
or ICE.” Federal agreements with local governments are explicitly designed to allow for the ad-
hoc detention of all federal prisoners in local jail spaces. These types of IGSA facility openings 
allow us to see the legal mechanisms that ICE utilizes to suddenly expand detention capacity, 
authorizing that local governments open up detention space for all federal prisoners if they are 
party to a contract with just one federal agency.  
Local Detention Economies: Economic Justifications from Local Lawmakers 
 Local governments still regularly agree to be parties to IGSA agreements, despite the 
scope of the obligations placed onto local governments in the language of the IGSA contracts 
themselves. The justification municipal decisionmakers most commonly proffered was economic 
in nature: 6 out of 8 (75%) of the openings cases saw local lawmakers either citing jobs or 
revenue as a major reason for initiating the IGSA agreement. These economic justifications took 
many forms, with some local governments emphasizing potential employment opportunities of 
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the facilities, some emphasizing revenue paid directly to the municipal fund, others emphasizing 
local revenue garnered through property taxes, and still others referring to secondhand positive 
economic externalities, such as increased demand for the services of local businesses. Table 3 
disambiguates all of the justifications utilized in the six openings where economic justifications 
featured in the rhetoric of municipal decisionmakers.  
 
Table 3. Common Economic Justifications for IGSA Contract Approval 
Name Jobs Property 
Taxes 
Direct 
Payment 
Economic 
Externalities 
Prairieland Detention Facility x 
  
x 
Kankakee County Jail (Jerome Combs) 
  
x 
 
Cibola County Correctional Center x x 
 
x 
Folkston Ice Processing Center (D. Ray James) x x 
 
x 
Cache County Jail 
  
x 
 
Beaver County Jail 
  
x 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation of local news coverage of IGSA contract initiation processes. 
Detention Economies from a Local Perspective 
 For local governments, the revenues and employment provided through the establishment 
of immigrant detention centers can appear to be a feasible solution to balancing precarious local 
budgets. In Cibola County, the re-opening of the Cibola County Correctional Center represented 
300 new employment opportunities in a municipality that was previously hard-hit by the closure 
of Peabody Energy Corp’s local coal mines (Macaraeg 2017). Similarly, the Folkston ICE 
Processing Center was touted as housing “more than 10 percent of Charlton [County’s] 2,000 
jobs” (Redmon 2018). The initiation of these contracts is seen as ushering in an increased 
demand for local goods and services in general. When discussing the terms of the newly 
inaugurated contract for the Prairieland Detention Facility, then County Manager Davis noted 
that the announcement of the contract was met with homes being purchased in the municipality, 
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in addition to increased business for local firms like gas stations and restaurants (Leanos Jr. 
2017).  
 Clearly, these contracts provide a perceived increase in marginal economic wellbeing to 
municipalities, at least from the perspective of local lawmakers, and indeed, this comports with 
findings in Chapter 1 that suggest a tendency for states with higher levels of unemployment to 
have more IGSA facilities per county. It is this dependency on carceral revenues, then, that 
makes the varied instances of sudden contract termination in the closures section of this chapter 
so consequential. Indeed, for all of the economically-grounded justifications for IGSA contract 
initiations found in this chapter’s sample of openings, the sample also provided multiple 
examples of the volatility and scarcity of these agreements. 
The Volatility of Detention Economics:  
Indeed, one of the very facilities studied in this chapter as a recent, newly opened IGSA 
facility was threatened with sudden closure by ICE less than five months after the IGSA was 
signed. Charlton County officials were notified “by email” that the five-year IGSA they had 
signed with GEO Group and ICE to run the Folkston ICE Processing Center was being cancelled 
due to “low usage” (Redmon 2017). The rationale of low usage came as news to county officials, 
who saw the 780-bed facility averaging around 588 detainees in any given week. This sudden 
closure process, less than half a year after the opening of the Folkston Processing Center, was 
stalled and ultimately reconsidered only through the involvement of U.S. Representative Buddy 
Carter (R-GA) and panicked pleas from county commissioners (Redmon 2018). Furthermore, the 
opening of the Prairieland facility in Texas was delayed significantly due to the insolvency of the 
original private contractor, Emerald Correctional Management, demonstrating again how the 
54 
 
volatility of IGSA agreements can stem from multiple sources outside of the municipality’s 
control, including the business decisions of distant private enterprises (Owen 2018).  
Economic volatility is present in IGSA contracts even when they aren’t suddenly cancelled 
by other parties. One striking finding from the sample of the openings was the size of the 
guaranteed, direct revenues to municipal governments provided through IGSA contracts. These 
revenues guaranteed directly to municipal governments through the terms of IGSAs are generally 
quite small, a factor that potentially explains why Table 3 showed that many economic 
justifications for these agreements focused on non-revenue benefits, such as employment. The 
direct compensation for hosting the Prairieland Detention Center, for example, is only a “small 
management fee will be paid to the city of Alvarado that escalates to $3 a person after 3 years” 
(Solis 2016).  
The negligibility of these administrative fees paid to local government are made especially 
clear when they are compared to the payouts given to private contractors that are party to these 
agreements. Recall again the example of Cibola County’s contract: $0.50 per detainee per day, 
compared to the flat-rate of $2.5 million dollars that is paid monthly to CoreCivic by the same 
contract (Macaraeg 2017). These low administrative fees also, in the case of Kankakee County, 
do not factor in the “cost of running the jail” (Kalantzis, 2016). As a result, Kankakee County’s 
IGSA provides a negligible contribution to the county’s revenue. As Sheriff Downey described 
the agreement, “the federal government is paying $80 per day per detainee, so the county is 
pulling in a little less than $6,000, minus food” (Kalantzis, 2016). 
 Direct revenue payouts to local governments are also volatile because of their 
contingency on detainee populations. As the case of Cibola County demonstrates above, 
oftentimes local governments are compensated via a per-diem rate that is based on the number of 
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detainees present in a facility, whereas private parties are given more stable, flat-rate payouts. 
This volatility of potential revenues proves consequential for cash-strapped local governments, 
who struggle with how exactly to factor such a variable payout into their budgetary calculations. 
The Cache County Sheriff, for example, admitted that the county’s approach to budgeting with 
the IGSA agreement was simply to “go through the contract for a full year” to “know for sure 
what revenues and costs we can expect” (Gefre 2016). This is simply the reality, because as 
Sheriff Jensen put it, “ICE is under no obligation to send exactly fifty inmates to the Cache 
County Jail”, even though the contract reserves space for those fifty beds. 
Conclusion 
Investigating samples of recent IGSA contract initiations and terminations revealed some of 
the many pragmatic consequences of these agreements for local decisionmakers. One significant 
finding was the significant variation in local processes for IGSA contracts. Which individual has 
the power to approve and dissolve these contracts varies from place to place, with some being 
overseen by municipal legislators, and others being overseen solely by the County Sheriff.  This 
variation in IGSA contracts specifically corresponds to the generally inconsistent nature of local 
prison partnerships with ICE. The Criminal Alien Program, for example, operates under “no 
single model” and instead functions more so like “an ad hoc process that varies depending on the 
ICE staff and the institution in which it is operating” (American Immigration Council 2013).  
Furthermore, this research demonstrated the tendency for ICE to site detention centers in 
ways that prove expedient. As investigations of the sample of facility openings demonstrated, 
ICE namely does this by taking advantage of previously federally contracted, vacant detention 
spaces. This is done in multiple ways, including clauses in IGSA agreements with the USMS that 
obligate local governments to accept all federal detainees, ICE prisoners among them, at a 
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moment’s notice. Prevalent also is what appears to be the specific targeting of former BOP-
affiliated facilities – in one particularly egregious instance, co-opting a recently closed BOP 
facility to re-open it under the same private contractor that was accused of medical neglect.  
Finally, investigations into the stories behind IGSA closures and openings reveal tensions 
between the economic justifications provided by local lawmakers upon contract initiation, and 
the realities of the economic precarity of IGSAs. Sources of economic precarity from IGSA 
agreements include a low guaranteed revenue, variable daily detainee populations, and even the 
threat of sudden contract dissolution from a private contractor or ICE itself. All of these findings, 
particularly the negative unintended consequences of such agreements for local governments, are 
the basis for the policy recommendations that will conclude this investigation.  
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Conclusion 
 This project revealed the contradictions and complications of local government 
involvement in federal immigration detention, shedding light on an understudied mechanism by 
which responsibility for immigration enforcement is devolved to the municipal level. 
Specifically, this national survey of recent IGSA contracts, combined with case studies of the 
termination and initiation of these contracts, revealed three key aspects about these detention 
facilities: how IGSAs are used to expedite and obfuscate the creation of new detention spaces, 
how the lack of consistent protocol for IGSAs creates confusion for local governments, and how 
the economic terms of these contracts often end up negatively affecting the local signatories to 
these contracts.   
1. Expediency Over Transparency: How & Why ICE Maintains a Revolving Door of Detention 
Space 
 As demonstrated by the frequency of closures and openings defined in Chapter 1, and the 
frequent citation of “lack of use” as a justification for sudden IGSA contract termination in 
Chapter 2, ICE uses IGSAs as a means of rapidly adding to their capacity of detention space 
while rapidly closing spaces that no longer meet their needs due to controversy or location. 
IGSAs are a crucial part of ICE’s maintenance of a steady revolving door of detention spaces: 
the expediency that comes from skirting the federally mandated requirement for an open-bidding 
period on federal contracts allows them to make up for any shortages of detention space. This 
expediency of establishing new detention beds is also seen through the kinds of “piggyback” 
clause contracts that constituted 1/4th of the total IGSA facility openings studied in Chapter 2. 
Indeed, this rhetoric of shortage and emergency is utilized frequently to justify ICE’s less-than-
transparent means of rapidly accruing detention beds, despite this rhetoric being utilized 
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simultaneously as old IGSA contracts are suddenly terminated for a lack of use: such was the 
case with the closure of Artesia and simultaneous rapid initiation of the contract and construction 
of the South Texas Family Residential Center.  
 ICE shows no sign of ceasing this pattern of behavior: at the time of writing, ICE has 
custody of over 50,223 migrants, one of the highest detainee populations on record since the 
agency’s inception. As a result of these high numbers of detainees, the former military prison at 
Guantánamo Bay is being floated by the agency as potential spillover detention space for migrant 
children (Dickerson, 2019). But such emergencies of detention space are not naturally occurring, 
or an inherent fact of global migratory flows. Rather, sudden spikes in demand for detention beds 
are the direct result of ICE’s own machinations and increasingly draconian policies on detention. 
Enacting a protocol of mandatory detention for all asylum-seekers is a political choice. It is also 
a choice to detain and deport long-time inhabitants of the US whose only crime committed is a 
civil immigration violation. This need to suddenly acquire and maintain massive amounts of 
detention space is not at all an inherent component of a country’s immigration policymaking. 
Indeed, the U.S. maintains the largest immigration detention system of any country, including 
those who receive similar rates of migratory flows, and by a large margin (Shah, Small, and Wu 
2015).  
2. Multi-layered Jurisdictional Mess: How A Lack of Transparency and Ad-Hoc Rulesmaking 
Leave Local Officials Scrambling 
This thesis also demonstrated the lack of consistent protocol for enacting and 
implementing these IGSA partnerships. Variability is the rule, with some IGSAs being overseen 
by sheriffs or the police departments, while others are enacted by municipal managers or 
councilmembers. Some IGSAs are used to reserve pre-existing space in local jails, while others 
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are means of constructing entirely new facilities dedicated to detention. This lack of codified 
protocol leaves local governments to deal with the consequences upon implementation, 
sometimes as they react to other conflicting immigration policy obligations: recall the explicit 
confusion of Montgomery County officials as they simultaneously operated under an IGSA and a 
newly enacted “sanctuary” policy. IGSAs are prevalent among local governments in California 
despite the state’s TRUST Act, creating spheres where local governments are caught in the polar 
contradictions of devolved immigration federalism: squarely in the middle of what Varsanyi 
(2010) calls the “multi-layered jurisdictional patchwork” of directly contradictory immigration 
policy cues and obligations.  
Adding to this confusion is ICE’s demonstrated shoddiness in maintaining accurate 
records of their pre-existing relationships with municipalities. Indeed, the first major finding of 
this project was the large quantity of downright mislabeled data in what is supposed to be the 
most comprehensive database of detention space that ICE has to offer. This poor management of 
data has consequences for local governments as well: Riverside Regional Jail, despite to the best 
of its knowledge complying with what they thought were their obligations to ICE, was still 
included on a publication from the agency listing all non-compliant jurisdictions (Remmers 
2017).  
 These logistical mistakes and shoddy recordkeeping are non-trivial: they have tangible 
consequences for those who are affected by ICE’s growing and indiscriminate detention dragnet. 
The fact that ICE continues to push so aggressively for more detention and deportations through 
their recent internal policy shifts towards mandatory detention, despite demonstrably not having 
the capacity to do so coherently, should give anyone pause.  
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3. Fiscal Instability: The False Promise of Detention Revenues 
 The case studies in Chapter 2 revealed that, even though IGSA contracts end suddenly 
and without warning due to the whims of private contractors or ICE, local governments continue 
to view these contracts as a means of generating yearly revenue. The result is fiscal instability for 
local governments, due to the volatility of these agreements and their payment structures. Some 
municipalities who enact these agreements for a boost to local revenue, are threatened with the 
termination of their contract in a matter of months, as was the case with the agreement that 
Charlton County initiated for the Folkston ICE Processing Center. Even when these agreements 
last, the payments that are guaranteed to local governments as a result of IGSAs are low: in 
comparison to the multi-million dollar payments guaranteed to private contractors for 
immigration detention centers, local governments are usually compensated through low per-diem 
rates that vary based on whether the facility receives transferred detainees or not. These per-diem 
rates vary, but are sometimes merely cents on the dollar, as was the case for Cibola County’s 
contract for 50 cents per detainee, per day. If revenue dips below the cost of operating the 
facility, local governments are saddled with these payments, and risk default if they cannot cover 
such outstanding payments (Gottschalk 2014). Indeed, 9 counties in Texas have defaulted on 
debt associated with immigration detention centers: they created agencies to issue municipal 
bonds to help with the cost of constructing and helping to manage private correctional facilities 
for migrants and defaulted on those bond payments when migratory flows to the Southern border 
to slow in 2015 (Etter 2015). Finally, the sudden siting of a large detention center in a fairly 
remote municipality can cause supply shocks that negatively impact local residents, as the run on 
baby formula in the wake of the opening of the Artesia Family Residential Center in New 
Mexico.  
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Policy Recommendations 
 As a result of these revelations about the consequences of IGSA agreements for local 
governments, this study concludes with a variety of policy recommendations for state and local 
lawmakers, not only to limit the negative consequences of these agreements to municipalities, 
but to supplement the short-term revenue boosts of these contracts with projects that proffer 
more long-term stability and have the potential to inspire understanding between native and 
foreign-born residents.  
Recommendation 1: Avoiding IGSA Collaboration 
Case studies of IGSA contracts reveal the unintended consequences they have for local 
governments: they are prone to legal controversy, draw the ire of local and national activists, and 
are sources of fiscal instability despite their promises to increase revenues. Therefore, the 
primary policy recommendation that this paper can offer is to avoid entangling municipal law 
enforcement in the business of immigration detention by being party to an IGSA. Furthermore, 
municipalities with existing IGSAs should take steps to end these agreements: termination that is 
initiated in advance by the municipality is much more workable than a sudden cancellation of a 
contract by ICE or a private contractor. This recommendation also entails that municipalities 
with existing relationships with USMS should also check those contracts for piggyback clauses 
that allow for the sudden inflow of ICE detainees, and re-negotiate those agreements to the best 
of the municipality’s ability.  
Recommendation 2: Preemption of IGSA Participation Via State Legislation 
 State pre-emption of local action on immigration is usually associated with restrictive 
measures, such as the pre-emption of any local non-cooperation with ICE by the Texas State 
Legislature under S.B. 4. However, state pre-emption has the potential to prevent the growth of 
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ICE’s detention network through local government signatories. One example is a pre-emption 
measure that threatened to terminate the Tri-County Detention Center’s IGSA with Ullin, 
Illinois. An Illinois Senate measure from 2012 – SB 1064 – would have prohibited state and 
local governments from contracting with private firms to run detention centers. Pre-empting 
contracts with private contractors is a good start, as it addresses the problem of local 
governments being used as “pass-through” signatories for ICE to transfer money to private firms 
without a public bidding process. However, there is still potential for more stark action to 
address IGSAs and their negative consequences for municipalities. State law could easily 
preemptively forbid local participation in IGSAs with ICE. Indeed, while California’s state 
“sanctuary act”, technically known as the California Values Act SB 54, could not force the 
termination of existing IGSAs, it banned the initiation of new partnerships that utilize state and 
local law enforcement resources to detain federal prisoners (Adler 2017).  
Recommendation 3: Immigrant-Friendly Alternatives to the Detention Economy 
In municipalities where terminating detention agreements will leave behind large, defunct 
detention facilities (such as the former BOP facility in Cibola County that was converted into an 
ICE detention center through an IGSA), the sites of former prisons have incredible potential for 
renewal into more stable economic boosters. A report for the Sentencing Project reveals that 
closed detention sites have been converted into economic development projects that can, at the 
very least, fill the void left by detention center layoffs: one New York prison has since turned 
into a movie studio that has brought 800 employment opportunities to the city. A former work 
camp in Illinois has since converted into an “agricultural development center, which is expected 
to generate an estimated $124 million in new farm income” (Porter, 2016).  
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 Collaborative participation on these more productive, less controversial, and more stable 
sites of local economic development has the added benefit of changing native-born residents’ 
perceptions of their foreign-born neighbors. Whereas locally-sited immigrant detention centers 
result in residents’ constant exposure to militarized and criminalized definitions of immigrants 
and immigration policy, the construction and completion of new sources of economic growth 
provides opportunities for collaborative work towards a common and shared goal – the 
prerequisites for growing tolerance and understanding under the contact theory of integration 
(Allport 1954).  
Looking Towards the Future 
 While this project provided a much needed comprehensive study of contemporary 
IGSAs, and began to answer the questions surrounding what drives their growth, it also 
prompted many additional questions that can serve as the basis for future research. First and 
foremost is the need for more exhaustive research that can begin to control for alternative factors 
via regression analysis: while this study focused its quantitative analysis at the state level, a 
fruitful path for future research on IGSAs is to construct a county-level dataset, which would 
better allow for regression analysis given the higher sample size. Another direction for future 
research is to more systemically study the existence of trends that were present in the case 
studies of this project. For example, the case of Artesia demonstrated how the sudden 
establishment of a detention facility in a relatively isolated municipality can lead to baby formula 
and diaper supply shocks in local grocery stores: is there a systemic pattern of microeconomic 
consequences correlated with the opening of new detention facilities? There were multiple 
examples of facility closures taking place shortly after some form of controversy, either a 
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scandal or instance of abuse in the detention facility, visible protest from activists and 
constituents, or both. Is there a causal mechanism to this relationship?  
 Given the recent policies and rhetoric from Trump’s DHS, the indiscriminate and 
incoherent detention drag-net studied here shows no signs of slowing its expansion. However, in 
light of this newly discovered information on how ICE’s detention network negatively impacts 
the municipal governments that are entangled in it, there is hope that local lawmakers and 
activists can assert their power to resist the creeping expansion of the detention state. Indeed, as 
municipal governments have grown to become the locus of non-compliance and outright 
resistance to immigration enforcement by enacting municipal ID policies and sanctuary 
ordinances, there is considerable potential for local governments to halt the expansion of 
immigration detention by not becoming expendable signatories onto IGSAs. 
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Methodological Appendix 
 
Data Gathering Procedure for Closures: 
1. Confirming legitimate closure of facility: Was an IGSA contract between ICE and the 
municipality terminated between 2015 and 2017? 
o If yes, the facility is coded as a confirmed closure, and step 2 is initiated.  
o If no, the facility is coded as a confirmed non-closure. 
o If no conclusive information is available either way, the facility is flagged for requests for 
personal correspondence outlined in step 3. 
2. Confirming details of contract termination: who initiated the termination of this contract: 
ICE, the municipality, or a private contractor? 
o Municipality-led contract termination: In the event that the contract was terminated by 
municipal decisionmakers, such as the county council, the articles were then openly 
coded for all factors that influenced the closure decision (specifically, any quoted reason 
from the relevant local decisionmaker, if available). The final coding scheme was 
inductively developed for municipal-led reasons: 
o Allegations of misconduct 
▪ Additionally, whether any allegations manifested into a formal lawsuit 
o Federal issue/ “not our jurisdiction”: 
o Sanctuary policy: 
o Protest from: 
▪ National/Outside Advocates 
▪ Local Advocacy Groups 
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▪ Residents  
o ICE-led contract termination: all ICE-led contract terminations were coded based on 
the reason given explicitly by DHS. Given the fact that only one closure in the sample 
was ICE-driven, the only code developed was for “insufficient use”.  
o Private contractor-led contract termination: all private contractor-led terminations 
were coded based on the reason given explicitly by the contractor. Given the fact that 
only one closure in the sample was privately driven, and that private contractor (GEO 
Group) did not give an explicit, specific reason for the termination, no further codes 
could be developed.  
3. Requests for personal correspondence: if the search of local newspaper archives yielded no 
definitive results, relevant municipal officials were contacted based on contact information on 
the relevant municipal website (such as public information officers, administrative assistants, and 
in some cases, general inquiry email addresses listed on the county website) using the following 
pre-established contact script: 
“[TITLE] [NAME], (or in the case of a general inquiry email address: “To Whom It May Concern,” 
My name is Brooke Williams, and I am a senior student at Trinity College. I am writing my final research 
project on local jails that have agreements with the federal government. I’m working off of data from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement which lists that the [JAIL NAME] recently ended an 
Intergovernmental Service Agreement to occasionally house immigrant detainees. However, I couldn’t find 
any local news sources that confirmed this, so I wanted to confirm the accuracy of this government data with 
you personally. 
- Did [TOWN/COUNTY] ever have an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement?  
- If so, did this agreement end recently?  
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- To your knowledge, was there a specific reason for this contract being terminated (for example, did ICE end 
the agreement because of infrequent use?) 
I sincerely appreciate your assistance with this assignment!” 
Data Gathering Procedure for Openings:  
1. Confirming legitimate opening of facility: Was a new IGSA contract between ICE and the 
municipality initiated between 2015 and 2017? 
o If yes, the facility is coded as a confirmed opening, and step 2 is initiated.  
o If no, the facility is coded as a confirmed non-opening. 
o If no conclusive information is available either way, the facility is flagged for requests for 
personal correspondence outlined in step 3. 
2. Confirming details of contract initiation: Was the process for this new IGSA contract 
initiated by ICE? If so, the facility was given a “ICE/Fed Demand” code.  
Federally-led IGSA openings took a couple distinct forms among the sampled openings that 
were further coded: 
Was this a “piggyback” contract, wherein ICE attached themselves to an already pre-existing 
agreement with the US Marshalls Service? 
o If yes, the facility was given a “piggyback contract” code. 
o If no, but the new IGSA with ICE was initiated in a space that had another form of pre-
existing agreement with the federal government, such as a former BOP facility, the 
facility was given a “pre-existing federal contract” code.  
All justifications of the new IGSA contract from municipal decisionmakers (councilmen, 
sheriffs, etc.) were coded as the following: 
o “Revenue” code was applied anytime a municipal decisionmaker directly referenced the 
additional revenue that the new contract would bring to the municipal government.  
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o “Jobs” code was applied anytime a municipal decisionmaker referenced the fact that the 
new contract facility would bring new employment opportunities to the municipality. 
o “Local resistance” code was applied anytime local sources noted that the initiation of the 
new contract was met with controversy or protest at town hall meetings, etc.  
3. Requests for personal correspondence: if the search of local newspaper archives yielded no 
definitive results, relevant municipal officials were contacted based on contact information on 
the relevant municipal website (such as public information officers, administrative assistants, and 
in some cases, general inquiry email addresses listed on the county website).  
o When a contact email was available, a solicitation for information was sent using a 
predetermined correspondence script: 
Hello Officer [NAME], 
 My name is Brooke Williams, and I am a senior student at Trinity College. I am writing my final 
research project on local jails that have agreements with the federal government. I’m working off of data 
from Immigration and Customs Enforcement which lists that the [JAIL NAME] recently established an 
Intergovernmental Service Agreement to occasionally house immigrant detainees. However, I couldn’t find 
any local news sources that confirmed this, so I wanted to confirm the accuracy of this government data 
with you personally. 
- Does [TOWN/COUNTY] have an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement?  
- If so, when did this contract begin? 
- To your knowledge, was there a specific reason for this contract being initiated?  
- Were there any factors that led to [TOWN/COUNTY] approving this new contract, like revenue or 
local employment opportunities? 
I sincerely appreciate your assistance with this assignment! 
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